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Abstract
Social description or social-scientific interpretation? A 
survey of modem scholarship.
R ecent interest in the social aspects of the first-century 
M editerranean world reflected in the texts o f the New 
Testam ent has taken primarily two directions. The one 
approach concentrates on social description, and the 
o ther on social-scientific in terp re ta tion . This article 
surveys the major works of several of the leading expo­
nents o f this type of study in  term s of the extent to 
which they m ake use of the social sciences. It differs 
from existing surveys by having an  in-depth look at the 
elements of social-scientific theory and method actually 
employed, and by making a comparative assessment of 
the importance allocated by different authors to the role 
of the text as a deliberate construction.
1. INTRODUCTION
Interest in the situational context of the biblical documents and the traditions which 
they contain, is not new. Well-known attem pts a t a  sociological in terpretation  of 
early C hristianity are  the Marxist reading (Scroggs 1980:177-179) and the Chicago 
school o f  New Testament studies (Funk 1976:4-22), both of which have been implicit­
ly o r explicitly reductionist in postulating social causes for all religious phenom ena 
(Schutz 1982:3-11; M eeks 1983:3). Also, the so-called form-critical school had an
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enquiry into the socio-historical background of a text as p a rt of its exegetical 
programme as early as the beginning of the century. The Sitz im Leben interest was 
concerned with collecting ‘explicit evidence as to social and historical context’ (Elliott 
1981:3; see also K Berger 1977:219), and used the data for asocial description of the 
presumed reconstructed socio-historical background of the texts. The same could 
be said about earlier investigations - termed ‘social’ or ‘socio-historical’ - by scholars 
such as Lohmeyer, Von Dobschiitz, Troeltsch, Matthews and Case (cf Scroggs 1980: 
164-165; Schiitz 1982:3-11, 21 notes 5 and 16; O siek 1984:3). T he in terest was 
primarily historical in character for theological relevance, and practically nothing 
can be found in those publications on the subject of social-scientific theory and /o r 
method (M eeks 1983:3). This earlier approach could therefore be term ed a naive 
description o f  social setting, whereby social information was used to undergird and 
supplement historical supposition.
The nineteen-seventies heralded a renewed interest in the social background of 
the New T estam ent docum ents. A fresh approach was indicated - com pared to 
earlier related  efforts - by an appropriation by biblical scholars of the theoretical 
and methodological insights provided by the social sciences - sociology, anthropo­
logy and psychology.
In contrast to the social description for historical relevance that resulted from 
earlier studies with a social interest (H arris 1984:102-103), the renewed interest by 
biblical scholars in the social dimension of texts from the outset stated its intention 
to take cognizance of and utilize the theoretical concepts and empirical methods of 
the scientific disciplines of sociology, anthropology and psychology, in o rder to 
explain the productive societal powers that gave rise to the biblical documents. The 
whole purpose of such an undertaking would be to better understand the text of the 
Bible. T here being no previous guidelines along which to proceed, a theoretical 
b a s is  and  m e th o d o lo g ic a l s t ru c tu re  fo r th e  a p p lic a tio n  o f  so c io lo g ica l, 
anthropological and psychological principles to  the texts o f the Bible had to  be 
constructed. The bewildering diversity of quantitative and qualitative methods and 
models that these disciplines present, has led to all kinds of exploratory work within 
the exegetical subdiscipline that has come to  be known as the sociology of the New 
Testam ent. D ifferent scholars have opted for different approaches, methods and 
models in trying to uncover new information on the social background of the New 
Testam ent (cf Smith 1975:19-21; Scroggs 1980:167-171; Best 1983:187-190; Edwards 
1983:431-444; Harrington 1988:77-85).
In the gathering m om entum  of publications on this new field o f interest, the 
indiscriminate use of the terms ‘social’ and ‘sociological’ resulted in the equating of 
social description  w ith  social-scientific explanation  (cf E llio tt 1981:3; M alina
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1982:241; Osiek 1984:4-6). This is unfortunate, because a genuine social-scientific 
app roach  o p e ra te s  on a  d iffe ren t level from  th a t o f social descrip tion . Best 
(1983:185) d istinguishes betw een two levels o f app lication  of social-scientific 
categories to  the New T estam ent, namely description and explanation  (see also 
G ager 1979:175), and states:
F or a truly sociological approach, however, one must move to the 
second level, that of explanation. H ere the tools and techniques of 
modern sociological study are used, not merely to describe but also to 
probe the inner dynamics of the early Christian movement, regarded 
no t as a unique event bu t as an exam ple o f pa tterns o f behaviour 
which may be widely observed and objectively studied.
(Best 1983:185)
G ager (1982) has shed even m ore light on the issue. R eferring  to  an  article by 
Smith (1975:19-20) in which no less than four  different approaches within this field 
were distinguished. G ager reserved the description ‘sociological’ or ‘social-scientific’ 
for the approach that, according to  Smith, encompassed ‘an analysis o f Christianity 
as a social world, as the creation of a world of meaning which provided a  plausibility 
structure for those who chose to inhabit it’ (Smith 1975:19-20; cf Domeris 1988:379). 
G ager states that only such an approach
can be properly characterized as sociological or, m ore broadly, social 
scientific, for it is only h e re  th a t specific academ ic d iscip lines - 
sociology, anthropology and psychology - have contributed explana­
tory theories and hypotheses.
(G ager 1982:258)
It is clear, then, that there is a  difference between the reference of the terms ‘social’ 
and ‘sociological’, and tha t this difference needs fu rther clarification. T he most 
log ical way to  s ta r t w ould be  to  tak e  a m ore d e ta ile d  look  a t th e  d iffe ren t 
approaches denoted by the above terms, in order to be able to judge the work of the 
authors under consideration properly.
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2. SOCIAL VERSUS S O aO L O G IC A L  APPROACH
It has been  noted by several scholars tha t some confusion exists as regards the 
reference of the above terms (cf Gager 1979:175; Gottwald 1982:143; Schutz 1982:1; 
Osiek 1984:4). The words have apparently been used interchangeably to refer to the 
study of any explicit data  in the New T estam ent texts on any societal phenom ena 
(both concrete and abstract) in the period of early Christianity, and mainly for the 
purpose o f historical interest. This means that the question facing the in terpreter 
changes from ‘W hat did the author m ean?’ to ‘Was there anything in the contempo­
rary societal structure that this utterance could be a  reflection of?’ The texts are 
processed in this way until every scrap of inform ation that might have some social 
relevance has been tagged and included in a  database. Then the database itself is 
sorted  into categories such as ‘cultu ral’, ‘political’, ‘econom ical’, and ‘religious’. 
Each of these categories contains the information on the different social institutions 
that could be assigned to it. Finally, the accum ulated information serves as a new 
source from  which to extract the inform ation  needed to reconstruct any of the 
settings tha t could be deem ed connected to an utterance in order to facilitate the 
understanding of th a t u tterance. C orroboration  for the reconstructed  setting is 
sought from both biblical and nonbiblical literary sources from the same period, and 
from archaeological evidence (Osiek 1984:4). In this way a picture emerges of the 
tim e of the origin o f early Christianity - a  picture containing much detail already, 
and being added to  all the time as new data emerge.
This w hole exercise, as well as the results tha t it may produce, is called by 
different names: social analysis, social description, socio-historical approach, social 
history, even sociological analysis. This is where the confusion starts, and it becomes 
imperative to  delineate the reference of the terms.
The procedure described above can be term ed a social description o r social 
history, bu t not a  sociological analysis. A  social description accumulates data that it 
regards as relevan t in o rder to contribute to the historical understanding of the 
background of the New Testam ent texts or text-segments (H arris 1984:105). W hen 
needed, pieces of the amassed information are fitted together like a  jigsaw puzzle. 
The structure of the text or the ideological point of view of the narrator or any other 
literary or redaktionsgeschichtliche concepts are of no consequence in this approach. 
Texts are  simply regarded as sociological informants of the m ost basic kind, con­
taining unreflected social data on diverse subjects (see Domeris 1988:379-381 for a 
concise discussion of social descriptions and histories).
By the term  sociological analysis, on the o th er hand, som ething com pletely 
different is m eant. It is already clear from previous discussion that ‘sociological 
approach/analysis’ refers to the implementation of methods of analysis and research
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based on epistem ologies relevant to the social sciences. The term  has a generic 
reference, bu t a t the sam e tim e it applies to  a specific d iscipline o f the social 
sciences, namely sociology. For the sake of clarification it would therefore be better 
to replace it with the broader term, that is, social-scientific analysis. The purpose of 
such analysis, to my mind, is not simply to accumulate data. Depending on the end 
towards which the analysis is done - which is an exposition of the meaning of the 
narrative discourse as autonom ous object d ’art - it may utilize the results o f the 
former method, while always striving to comprehend and explain the data. A  social- 
scientific analysis abstracts data in the sense of unearthing, making explicit w hat is 
buried and im plicit in the narrative discourse. An analogy to  this process can be 
found in G enette’s (1980) narratological theory. H e also abstracted the story (récit) 
from  th e  narra tive  discourse (histoire). The analysis o f the récit concerns the 
reciprocal relations between the characters (Van Aarde 1988:238).
M ethodologically speaking, the only direct and explicit social inform ation we 
have for the contextual history of the text is the literary work itself, constituting a 
social fact. Social-scientific data  w ithin the narrative is not directly accessible or 
availab le  for a h isto rical (re)construction . O f course it can  be, and  is being, 
accessed in that way, but I would regard this as methodologically fallacious. Such 
data have acquired the characteristics of literary elements, and should be analyzed as 
such. Translating such literary-social data into pure social data fit to be used in a 
historical (re)construction, is a rather complex procedure. It involves an integration 
of literary analysis and social-scientific analysis in a  way that is beneficial to both 
disciplines, and, m ost o f all, should deliver resu lts tha t are able to stand up to 
critical evaluation. First, a thorough literary analysis should be m ade of the text, 
according to its type (i e narrative). Then, on the macro-social level o f the relation­
ship betw een ideas and social reality, the text can be analysed in term s of some 
macro-theory - Durkheimian, W eberian or Marxist. To use Theissen’s terms, such a 
m acro-sociological analysis could be term ed a ‘structural hom ologue’ (Theissen 
1978:26-27, 121 note 8; 1982:190) of the narrative analysis of the work. According 
to  Theissen the concept ‘structural homologue’ designates a  structural correspond­
ence between different entities or phenomena, and by the correspondence a connec­
tion  is estab lished  (T heissen 1978:26). T hen, on the m icro-social level o f the 
relationship between the author and the reader, and using the results of the macro- 
sociological analysis, the text can be analysed in terms of communications theory by 
m eans of interpretive models from  the fields of sociology, anthropology and psyc­
hology. Such analysis would constitu te  a ‘structural hom ologue’ to  the literary 
analysis of reader response. Finally, the results from both the literary and the macro 
and micro-sociological analyses are used to interpret and explain not the historical
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world, but the narrative or referential world of the text. In other words, at this time 
the interpreter is still moving within the text.
Only now can the interpreter use the database constructed by the accumulation 
of explicit social data, and use it for the purpose of comparison. TTie explicit data is 
considered to constitute tha t which is norm al, tha t is, the ‘habitualized  activity’ 
associated with the ‘typificatory schem es’ tha t apply to everyday life (B erger & 
Luckmann 1967:28-31, 53-54). The narrative world, created by the text, should be 
com pared to  the everyday historical world to which the text belongs in order for 
those elem ents within the narrative world that are new, different or strange, to  be 
discernible and identifiable. Only on the basis of the inform ation procured in this 
way can we begin to make inferences about the social setting for which the text was 
intended.
3. T H E  R O LE O F  SOCIAL SCIENCE THEO RY
In this, the main part of the article, the approaches of some of the major exponents 
of this type of study will be discussed. Only a  few South African scholars - such as 
D e Villiers (1984), Joubert (1987; 1990), Domeris (1988), and Botha (1989) - have 
worked on the subject of the social-scientific study of the New Testament. Several 
other articles exist which provide readers with an introduction to the social-scientific 
approach towards the New Testam ent (e g Scroggs 1980; M alina 1982, 1983; Best 
1983; Osiek 1984; Elliott 1986). Most of these works are general surveys of the field 
of study. The purpose of the present survey is to determ ine more specifically the 
nature and content of the social-scientific approach of the scholars under conside­
ration. Works of the following authors, representing the mainstream of the social- 
scientific study o f the New T estam ent, will be assessed: John  H  E lliott, John  G 
Gager, Bruce J  Malina, Wayne A Meeks, Norman R Petersen, G erd Theissen. The 
o rd e r  in  w hich they a re  tre a te d  is no t significant, except th a t it re flec ts  the 
approximate chronological sequence in which they published their major works.
3.1 G erd Theissen
In his work entitled Sociology o f  early Palestinian Christianity (1978) Theissen uses 
the sociological method known as functional analysis. He analyses the texts in terms 
o f roles, factors and functions in accordance with sociological insights into social 
dynamics (cf Theissen 1978:4). This entails that he scans the (designated) texts for 
inform ation or data  that can be construed as representing or reflecting m atters of 
sociological interest. The aim  of his study is to describe the Jesus m ovem ent in 
terms of its genesis, composition, conduct and influence. This is a purely descriptive
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and comparative study. In essence it is the same icind of enterprise as undertaken by 
the form-critical school in determining the Sitz im Leben of a specific phenomenon, 
albeit in this instance by means of the application of a  scientifically constructed, 
verifiable method or interpretive model from the discipline of sociology.
Theissen (1978:1) makes a distinction betw een an analysis of roles - which 
investigates typical patterns of behaviour, an analysis of factors - which investigates 
the way in which this behaviour is determined by society, and an analysis of function
- which investigates the effects of a group on society. He makes no attem pt to find a 
social ‘first cause’, because econom ic, ecological, political and cultural factors 
cannot be separated in their reciprocal interaction.
In another essay on methodology, Theissen (1982:176-177; cf M alina 1982:238 
for a sim ilar view) sta tes his conviction tha t a sociological s ta tem en t seeks to  
describe and explain interpersonal behavior with reference to those characteristics 
which transcend the personal.
First of all, then, a sociological question is less concerned with what is 
individual than with what is typical, recurrent, general. Second, it is 
less concerned with the singular conditions of a specific situation than 
with structural relationships which apply to several situations.
(Theissen 1982:177)
The procedure by means of which he proposes to accomplish the sociological task 
sketched in the quotation above, is that used in the form-critical analysis of texts 
(see T he issen  1982:177), by w hich he shows h im self to  be co n sis ten t in his 
indebtedness to the form-critical tradition for his whole approach.
According to this procedure sociological information has to be extracted from 
the sources by a process of inference. T hree  d ifferent types of m ethod may be 
distinguished (cf Theissen 1978:3; 1982:177; see also Osiek 1984:43):
■ C onstructive conclusions  a re  draw n from  an  ev a lu a tio n  o f p re -sc ien tif ic  
statem ents which give either prosopographic information about the background, 
status and roles of individuals (Scroggs 1980:174), or sociographic information 
ab o u t the p rogram m e, o rganization  and p a tte rn s  of behav iou r o f groups, 
institutions, organizations and other larger communities. According to Theissen 
(1982:177) there  are  very few sociographic statem ents about early C hristian 
groups, while prosopographic statem ents about individuals are more numerous 
(Theissen 1982:178). In accordance with social-scientific m ethods of handling
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empirical data, such statements are to be assessed in terms of reliability, validity 
and representativeness (Theissen 1982:178).
■ Analytic methods afford an indirect approach to sociological information. Such 
m ethods are used - in the absence of explicit d a ta  - to draw inferences from 
statem ents about (recurrent) historical events (cf Theissen 1978:3; 1982:181- 
182), ab o u t conflicts betw een  groups o r over e th ica l and  legal norm s (cf 
Theissen 1978:3; 1982:182-186), and from religious symbols like literary forms 
and poetic modes of expression, e g parables, structural homologues, et cetera 
(cf Theissen 1978:3; 1982:187-191; see especially Theissen 1982:198, note 28 for 
a discussion on structural homologues).
■ Comparative methods are geared towards establishing what is typical for eariy 
C hristianity. This can be done in one of two ways: e ither by analysing the 
differences brought forward by a comparison between early Christianity and the 
surrounding culture, or by analysing the analogies betw een not only the said 
groups, but also between Christianity and any ‘comparable movements, groups, 
or phenom ena of whatever e ra ’ (Theissen 1982:192). According to  Theissen 
(1982:192), th e re fo re , it is possib le to  com pare  early  C hris tian ity  to  ‘all 
m essianic-chiliastic m ovem ents, w here again and again we find com parable 
characteristics....’ Theissen (1982:194) admits that ‘the disadvantage of any such 
procedure relying on analogies is its relative lack of precision’, but still thinks it 
w orthy o f investigation . It should be s ta ted  in critique  against Theissen, 
however, that this admission negates his own rem ark about the social-scientific 
assessm en t o f em pirica l d a ta  in  te rm s of re liab ility , valid ity  and  re p re ­
sentativeness (cf preceding discussion on ‘constructive conclusions’) - o r is it a 
m atter of inadequacy of theoretical explanation?
Concluding his discussion of methodology, Theissen (1982:195) remarks:
It is no t necessary to  em phasize tha t the p rospect of achieving an 
approxim ate com prehension of the m a tte r to  be investigated , by 
means of adequate statem ents about it, depends on the plurality, and 
m ethodological independence, o f various procedures for drawing 
inferences.
R eaders  am ongst the scholarly com m unity have com plained ab o u t the lack of 
reference to social-scientific theory or conceptual models in most o f Theissen’s work 
(c f G ager 1979:175; Schutz 1982:15; O siek  1984:45; Edw ards 1983:435; E llio tt 
1986:11), which makes it difficult to evaluate his approach and the results of his
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studies. It is clearly recognized, however, that Theissen has a wide knowledge of 
social-scientific theory, and can use the aspects o f it th a t a re  applicable to  the 
material (see for instance G ager 1979:175; Scroggs 1980:174). According to Schiitz 
(1982:16) Theissen is concerned about ‘a general critical theory of religion which 
will also be responsive to the historian’s perception o f religious data....’ Within the 
general critical theory Theissen’s choice for functionalist analysis assigns to him an 
in term ediate position betw een phenomenological analysis on the one hand, which 
proceeds from  th e  assum ption tha t religion has distinctive characteristics that 
differentiate it from normal reality and therefore make it inaccessible to sociological 
analysis (cf Schiitz 1982:16), and reductionistic analysis on the o ther hand, which 
assigns to all religious phenom ena some non-religious origin, and which therefore 
exposes itself to  the criticism of being reductionist (cf Schiitz 1982:16; see M alina 
1982:237 for a  discussion of reductionism  as the process of subsuming one model 
into another).
‘Functionalism’ as a methodological concept for sociological analysis proceeds 
from the theoretical assumption that the normal and desired condition for a  group 
or society is to be in equilibrium, because a state of equilibrium is conducive to the 
p ro p e r and  e ffic ien t function ing  o f th e  collective p a rts  o f society  (cf E llio tt 
1985:332). Functionalism distinguishes between ‘manifest’ and ‘latent’ functions, or, 
in T h e issen ’s term s, ‘subjective in ten tio n ’ and ‘objective function ’ (cf Schutz 
1982:17). According to this theory a religious phenom enon’s subjective intention ( = 
what it is m eant to do) is not (necessarily) the same as its objective function (=  what 
it does). Theissen limits his functionalist analysis to those aspects that serve basic 
social needs in a specific frame of reference (society); those needs are twofold: the 
production of order (that is, the integration of the members of that society), and the 
control and overcom ing of conflict through change (cf T heissen 1978:2). Schiitz 
(1982:17) states:
These polar opposites are not regarded as mutually exclusive virtues 
(o r vices), as if viewed from an ideological presum ption of what the 
social frame should be like. Instead, they are regarded as two ends of 
a continuum along which all social organisms seek an accommodation 
or balance of forces.
To this axis, m arked by the ends integration-conflict, Theissen adds another axis, 
marked by the ends creative-restrictive functions of religion. This results in a ‘grid 
o f theoretical perspectives on religion on which he is able to locate m ost o f the 
classical theories, and by m eans of which he can underline the centrality  of the
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functionalist approach...’ (Schiitz 1982:18). For the different aspects compounded 
into this model, Theissen is dependent upon Durkheim, Marx, Berger & Luckmann, 
and W eber (cf G ager 1979:175). According to Theissen (1978:2; see also Edwards 
1983:435) ‘religion can be a social cement and an impulse towards renewal: it can 
in tim idate people and force them  to conform, or can help them  to act indepen­
dently. In primitive Christianity the innovative function of religion appears most 
clearly’.
Precisely because of this stance ‘functionalism’ should be much more ‘palatable’ 
in more conservative theological circles (although Kiimmel 1985:343-348 severely 
criticizes Theissen), and very much in keeping with a position where the historical 
in te re s ts  d o m in a te  and socio logical d a ta  a re  in ten d ed  to  serve a h is to rica l 
reconstruction. One of the criticisms of the functionalist perspective is precisely that 
it reflects a  conservative bias (cf Cohen 1968:58). It is therefore not surprising that 
T heissen has chosen this approach, considering what has been established about 
him already, namely his indebtedness and loyalty to the traditional historical-critical 
approach (see the preceding discussion). T hat is why it can be said that he leans 
m ore toward social history than towards abstract sociological theory in his works 
(Schutz 1982:20; cf H arris 1984:107). It is also clear, though, that Theissen is not 
bound to one method - he himself has pleaded for the use of any method if it proves 
to have heuristic value (Theissen 1978:4-5; 1982:195; see also Scroggs 1980:166-167; 
cf E lliott 1986:10-26, for a detailed discussion and evaluation of T heissen’s func­
tionalist approach; M alina 1982:240, note 18 for criticism  on T heissen’s use of 
psychological models).
3.2 John G Gager
G ager (1975) published one of the first books in A m erica to  em ploy the social 
sciences in an investigation into the social setting of the early Church as portrayed in 
the New Testam ent (cf Edwards 1983:432). In this work. Kingdom and community: 
The social world o f  early Christianity, he set out to give a comprehensive sociological 
account of the social world in which early Christianity had its origins (cf Tidball 
1983:26).
According to  H arris (1984:107) G ager is ‘m ore intentionally sociological than 
Theissen’, although Edwards (1983:435) maintains exactly the opposite view: ‘The 
w ork o f G erd  Theissen...show s considerably deeper im m ersion in  sociological 
method’. Be that as it may. Gager does use a  variety of sociological and anthropolo­
gical m odels, such as conflict theory, the in terp re ta tion  of symbols, sociology of 
knowledge and, especially, the theory o f cognitive dissonance (cf G ager 1975; see 
also M alina 1982:235; 1986c:35-55; Edwards 1983:433; H arris 1984:108). G ager uses
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a comparative approach (cf Harris 1984:108). H e studies early Christianity by com­
paring it with millenarian movements, and reasserts his acceptance of the validity of 
such a comparison several years later; ‘I rem ain convinced that the most im portant 
insights into the fundam ental character o f early Christianity are to be derived from 
an th ropo log ica l and sociological studies o f popu la r and m illenarian  religious 
movements which have nothing to do with the time or region of the New Testam ent’ 
(G ager 1982:261). According to Osiek (1984:39) ‘G ager attem pts...to understand 
the dynamics of Jesus’ ministry and the early years o f the Church as a movement of 
dram atic expectation’ (cf also Tidball 1983:27; see G ager 1982:261, notes 21, 22, 23 
for bibliographic references to anthropological studies on millenarian movements). 
T he validity of drawing such analogies betw een early C hristianity and (m odern) 
millenarian movements (like the cargo cults) is accepted by some (cf Osiek 1984:40) 
and disputed by others (cf Edwards 1983:434; Malina 1986c:55; Tidball 1983:37-40).
T o accoun t for the fact th a t early  C hris tian ity , un like  o th e r m illenarian  
movements, endured and even grew. G ager used the psychological theory of cogni­
tive dissonance - a  theory proposed by Festinger (1957) to describe the state brought 
about in individuals by ‘discrepancies betw een action and cognition’ (Sargent & 
W illiam son 1966:225). For example, a sm oker who knows tha t sm oking causes 
cancer bu t continues the habit, dem onstrates an inconsistency betw een his overt 
behavior and his knowledge. H e is engaging in counter-attitudinal behaviour and 
thereby  becom es prone to  cognitive dissonance. Papineau (1978:168) uses the 
concept attitudinal consistency to describe the same phenomenon as is described by 
cognitive dissonance, even citing th e  sam e exam ple. A ccording to  P ap ineau  
(1978:169) attitudinal inconsistency is experienced when two o r m ore potentially 
conflicting desires are involved. The need to reduce attitudinal inconsistence and 
obtain consistency leads to  the adoption of certain beliefs. Papineau regards such 
beliefs that serve to  reduce inconsistency as ideological: ‘The common notion of an 
"ideological" belief would...be of a  belief which is prom ulgated in order to defend 
actions or policies which are in the interest of a certain group, by presenting those 
actions or policies as having results which are accepted as being in the general good’ 
(Papineau 1978:169).
The following definitions of the concept ‘cognitive dissonance’ are given:
■ ‘Cognitive dissonance may be described as "psychological tension having moti­
vational characteristics" which occurs when a person has "two cognitions which 
are  som ehow discrepant with each other"’ (Sargent & W illiamson 1966:225, 
quoting from Brehm & Cohen 1962:3,11)
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■ ‘[T]he crucial and necessary condition for the production of dissonance is that 
psychologically the two elem ents are inconsistent in the sense that the opposite 
of one follows from the other’ (Freedman, Sears & Carlsmith 1978:428).
T he assum ption of the theory is th a t there  is in individuals a tendency toward 
cognitive consistency. Inconsistency, or dissonance, therefore needs to be reduced - 
the greater the dissonance, the more pressure there is to reduce it (Freedman, Sears 
& Carlsmith 1978:430). Dissonance therefore becomes a drive (Sargent & William­
son 1966:225; cf also Freedm an, Sears & Carlsmith 1978:430). Festinger himself 
formulated the following basic hypotheses for the theory:
• The existence of dissonance, being psychologically uncomfortable, will motivate 
the person to try to reduce the dissonance and to achieve consonance.
• W hen dissonance is present, in addition to trying to reduce it, the person will 
actively  avoid s itu a tio n s  and  in fo rm ation  th a t w ould likely increase  the 
dissonance.
• The presence of dissonance gives rise to pressures to eliminate the dissonance. 
The strength  of the pressures to reduce the dissonance is a  function of the 
m ag n itu d e  o f the d issonance  (F es tin g e r 1957:18, q u o ted  in  S a rg en t & 
Williamson 1966:225).
F reedm an, Sears and Carlsmith (1978:430) distinguish three major ways to reduce 
dissonance: first, by reducing the importance of the dissonant elem ents; second, by 
adding consonant elements-, and third, by changing one of the dissonant elem ents so 
that it becomes consistent with the others.
A  high level of dissonance is generated when a person puts a great am ount of 
energy into a com m itm ent o r decision, and his expectations about its effects are 
disappointed (cf Freedm an, Sears & Carlsmith 1978:434). The dissonance aroused 
by disconfirmed expectations can be reduced in various ways (cf Freedm an, Sears & 
C arlsm ith 1978:435), one of which is to confirm  the correctness o f the original 
belief, while conceding tha t the disconfirm ed expectations were incorrect. This 
reaction was perceived by Festinger, Reicken & Schachter (1956) in their study of a 
group who predicted  the end of the world, while they expected to  be saved by a 
spaceship. Instead of giving up their belief and return ing  to norm al life (which 
action would not have reduced the dissonance caused by all the energy expended in 
their planning), they decided that the day had been postponed, but the end of the 
world was coming soon. They also changed their style dram atically - instead of 
be ing  re se rv ed  and  avoiding publicity , they suddenly  s ta rted  rec ru iting  new
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m em bers. This gain in the num ber of m em bers would presum ably reduce their 
dissonance by showing that their original beliefs were correct, because m ore and 
more people were accepting them (cf Freedman, Sears & Carlsmith 1978:435). (For 
a concise and inform ative discussion of all aspects o f the cognitive dissonance 
theory, see Freedm an, Sears & Carlsmith 1978:426-461. For reservations on the 
experiments and findings based on the theory, see Rosenberg 1965.)
G ager (1975:20-40; cf also Gottwald 1982:145) employed the theory of cognitive 
dissonance to  explain why an apocalyptic-prophetic group ‘whose theory (myth) 
ceases to  fit the observable facts’ (Edwards 1983:434) may consequently cease to 
exist, bu t may also ‘intensify its fervor and translate its energy into an expanded 
missionary movement’ (Osiek 1984:41-42). G ager postulates both Jesus’ crucifixion 
and the delay of the parousia as instances o f ‘disconfirmation’, causing a  sense of 
cognitive dissonance which resulted in ‘the intellectual response of reassessment and 
re in terp re ta tion ..., and the social response of proselytism  or mission activity...’ 
(O siek 1984:42; cf Scroggs 1980:173 for the conditions tha t a re  required  if p ro ­
selytizing is to occur following disconfirmation).
T he m ost serious charge against G ager’s Kingdom and Community (1975) is 
brought in by Smith (1978:123), and it concerns w hat he calls ‘the imprecision of 
G ager’s aims’. According to Smith (1978:123-4) this work’s subtitle. The social world 
o f  early Christianity, consists of two parts, nam ely the phrases ‘social world’ and 
‘early C hristianity’. The first of these signals theory and methodology (cf Smith 
1975:21 for definitions of ‘social world’), and the last is a  m atter o f ‘domain’, that is 
the phenom enon that is being studied. Any social world in its concrete expression at 
basic level as a community must, according to Smith (1978:124), exist in some place 
a t a  c e rta in  tim e - it canno t rem ain  in the abstract. U sing th e  term s ‘world- 
construction’ and “world-maintenance’ as defined within the sociology of knowledge 
by Berger & Luckmann (1967), Gager displays a processual understanding of social 
world. Y et he fails to achieve concreteness, to arrive at that world he believes the 
early Christians to be creating (Smith 1978:125). This fact gave rise to  the title of 
Smith’s review article: Too much kingdom, too little community - a  play on G ager’s 
own title (cf Smith 1978:123). Smith (1978:125) accuses G ager o f adopting ‘an all 
too  easy functionalism ’ when being at all sociological, and claims tha t he is not 
really concerned with social construction, the analysis of symbolic worlds or asking 
social questions (Smith 1978:129), Smith’s verdict (1978:124) on G ager’s theoretical 
pretensions is: ‘...this book must be judged a  noble failure....’
O ther criticisms of G ager’s approach are mainly directed at his assumption that 
early C hristianity can be in terpre ted  by reverting to  com parisons with the mille- 
narian movements (cf Best 1983:189), or that the continuing existence of Christia­
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nity, desp ite  its beliefs and hopes and expectations being unfu lfilled , can be 
explained by reference to the psychoanalytic phenom enon of cognitive dissonance. 
M alina, particularly, has taken  up this issue, and is very critical o f G ager: ‘...to 
employ a  model from contemporary U.S. experience, such as Festinger’s cognitive 
dissonance model, to directly explain som ething in the M editerranean world, and 
the first century M editerranean at that, seems highly suspect (I find this to be the 
case with nearly all of the explicit models used by Gager, 1975 ...)’ (M alina 1986c:38; 
see also M alina 1982:240, and note 20 on the sam e page, for additional b ib lio­
graphic references for a so-called ‘balanced approach to the m odel’). Also, the 
theory of cognitive dissonance cannot adequately explain the confirming propensities 
of Jesus’ resurrection (Osiek 1984:42-43; cf Tracy 1978:133). While G ager ascribes 
the survival of the early Christian groups to their overcoming their sense of cognitive 
dissonance, Malina (1986c:39) proposes exactly the opposite:
R ather than any attem pt to solve the cognitive dissonance resulting 
from the disconfirmation of its belief system, I will argue that it was 
the dissonance itself along with the normative inconsistencies typical 
of early Christian movement groups that best accounts for the survival 
and growth of these groups....[I]n the social setting o f earliest Chris­
tianity, normative inconsistency was the rule.
It is clear that G ager has fewer followers than critics on the issues discussed above. 
It is equally clear, though, tha t G ager’s m ajor work, Kingdom and Community, 
exhibits the sam e pioneering spirit th a t is found in Theissen, and for tha t G ager 
should receive credit.
3 3  Wayne A  Meeks
Even before Theissen and G ager started  writing in earnest on the subject of the 
social-scientific study of the New Testam ent, Meeks (1972) w rote an article - The 
m an from  heaven in Johannine sectarianism  - in which he utilized concepts and 
theories from the sociology of knowledge to explain the reason for the creation of 
the m otif o f the Johann ine  descending/ascending redeem er. M eeks (1972:41) 
m aintains that the Gospel of John was actually intended to be incomprehensible to 
outsiders, because it was m eant to provide ‘a  symbolic universe which gave religious 
legitimacy, a  theodicy, to the group’s actual isolation from the larger society’ (Meeks 
1972:70). It had its origin in the social context of the Johannine community. Berger 
(1977:230) criticized this notion of ‘insiders’, saying: ‘Die "outsiders" des JohEv und 
der einzige "insider", Jesus, sind in dieser Position nur literarisch gesehen’. Still,
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even a t th a t early  stage M eeks had  show n ‘the  im m ense possib ilities in this 
approach’ (Scroggs 1980:176).
Several years later, Meeks (1983) designated his major work on the subject of 
social aspects in the New Testam ent a social description or social history of Pauline 
C hristian ity  (M eeks 1983:2; see also G ottw ald  1982:144; H arris 1984:108). He 
defined his task in a  double sense: ‘...to the limit that the sources and our abilities 
perm it, we must try to  discern the texture of life in particular times and particular 
places. A fter that, the task of the social historian of early Christianity is to describe 
the life of the ordinary Christian within that environment - not just the ideas or the 
self-understanding of the leaders and writers’ (M eeks 1983:2). The work seems to 
be m ore complex than a mere description, however, because Meeks (1983:2-7) has 
shown himself to be quite aware of the problems surrounding the interpretation of 
historical texts. In his words:
In writing social history, then, we cannot afford to ignore the theories 
that guide social scientists. But which o f the com peting schools of 
sociology or anthropology or social psychology shall we heed? At what 
level o f our inquiry and on what scale are theoretical proposals use­
ful? To w hat degree of overall coherence can we reasonably aspire, 
w ithout endangering our appreciation of our object’s stubborn parti­
cularity? T here is no comprehensive theory of social movements so 
commanding that we would be prudent to commit our m ethod to its 
care. Even if there were, we should be suspicious of it. Christianity, 
even at the earliest m om ent we can get any clear p icture of it, was 
already a  complex m ovem ent taking form  within several complex 
societies. W hat social theory is adequate to grasp the whole?
(M eeks 1983:5)
D efin ing his approach  as interpretive description, M eeks (1983:6) sketches his 
application of social science as ‘eclectic’, and his use of theory to be ‘piecemeal, as 
needed, when it fits’. Having said this, Meeks (1983:6) nonetheless speaks about a 
‘family of perspectives shared by a growing num ber of social scientists and historians 
of religion’ to which he also subscribes. According to  this perspective ‘society is 
viewed as a  process, in which personal identity and social forms are mutually and 
continuously  c rea ted  by in terac tions th a t occur by m eans of sym bols’ (M eeks 
1983:6). Meeks (1983:7) refers to his own position as that of a  ‘m oderate functio­
nalist’ w ithin this approach, and then again regards him self as ‘adopting a  func­
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being reductionistic.
In a comprehensive and detailed review o f M eeks’s The first urban Christians, 
E lliott expresses surprise at the fact that Meeks does not explicate his theoretical 
p resuppositions, and s ta tes  (cf also G ottw ald  1982:144; T iryakian  1985:1139; 
R ohrbaugh 1987:110-113, 117-118 notes 24,25,27,30): ‘M eeks, it would appear, 
would like to have it both ways - the safety of theory-free social description and the 
occasional dalliance with sociological research...
M eeks...is reluctant to explicate his sociological theory and models 
and to  spell out m ore adequately the im plications of his m oderate 
functionalist perspective on the Pauline social world. Consequently, it 
is often  unclear how  his ‘piecem eal theory’ informs and shapes his 
conclusions and how these conclusions are to be evaluated.
(Elliott 1985:332-334)
Tiryakian (1985:1139) confesses to having an ‘im pression of conceptual fragmen­
tation rather than of a unified piece’ after reading Meeks’s work. Schollgen (1988) 
criticises Meeks on several points (not all of which are valid to my mind), the most 
im portant of which are: too little inform ation to  build valid conclusions on, and: 
transforming possibilities into certainties. Schollgen (1988:75) formulates:
D er m ethodische Fehler von Meeks, der sich der Schwachen vieler 
seiner Einzelargum ente durchaus bewusst ist, liegt in der Annahme, 
dass viele nur mogliche Interpretationen im Sinne einer Konvergenz- 
argum entation  zusam m engezogen die hoheren  W eihen der W ahr- 
scheinlichkeit erhalten.
W hether Meeks intentionally sought to  ‘have it both ways’ or not is unsure, but he 
seems to have succeeded where Theissen failed, and that is to get a hearing with the 
m ore conservative theologians, if Kiimmel (1985:359) can be regarded as their 
spokesman: ‘...im ganzen sind M.s Ausfiihrungen iiberzeugend und weiterfiihrend....’ 
O n average, and despite the criticism, M eeks’s work has been well received, 
described as ‘the best single volume on the Pauline social world’ (Elliott 1985:333) 
at the time and a ‘balanced use of historical-critical and sociological-anthropological 
methods and theories’ (Harris 1984:110).
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3.4 Bruce JM alin a
While, in the above discussion on Theissen, G ager and Meeks, criticism has been 
voiced concerning the lacic o f explication of their theory and the models they use, 
the sam e could not be said about M alina. H e has w ritten  extensively, and has 
always been  a t pains to  explicate both theory and model. M alina has also done 
some invaluable work towards making the complex realm of social-scientific theory 
and models accessible to the interested reader by writing clearly and concisely on 
the subject (cf M alina 1982:229-242; 1983:119-133 for short introductions to  his 
w ork; cf 1986a, especially  pages 1-27, fo r a com prehensive  exp lica tion  and 
application of ‘practical models for biblical interpretation’).
An im portant observation by M alina (1982:237) on the use of models is the 
following:
...human beings generate models in o rder to  understand their expe­
riences. No m odel tha t we know of is useful for every conceivable 
purpose. T here is no model to  help understand all m odels, just as 
there is no language that one could learn to be able to understand all 
languages. The use of models is like the use of tools; in this sense 
models are question-specific or area-specific constructs. The appro­
priate model depends on the type of inform ation one seeks to  gene­
rate and comprehend.
W hile this is true in general, it is also true  o f specific and contro lled  efforts to 
interpret human society or some aspect of it. A  ‘social system’, according to Malina 
(1982:232), is actually a sort of model intrinsic to any human group. Its function is 
to provide ‘categories of human experience and behavior that serve to help under­
stand, control, and predict the flow of human interaction’. Therefore, any effort to 
understand or interpret human behaviour is based on some model of how the system 
works, and this is true whether it is acknowledged (explicit models) or not (implicit 
models) (cf Carney 1975:5; Malina 1982:232; Elliott 1986:6).
It is characteristic  o f the social sciences to  use the m odels - w hether socio­
logical, anthropological, political, economic, educational, religious, cross-cultural or 
psychological (M alina 1982:232) - to examine human interaction in terms of what is 
typical and recurrent. This poses a problem  when social systems are to be in ter­
preted  tha t a re  not available for observation, such as those of the early Christian 
groups. These groups are presented to us as p art o f the content o f literary texts, 
whose main character is not simply descriptive, but ideological. In o ther words, the 
au th o r w ould em ploy only such inform ation  (possibly o f in te rest to  the  social
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sciences) as would be instrumental to his ideological point of view and purpose. In 
addition, the inform ation would be in the guise of a way of expression peculiar to 
the author, and therefore  incidental. This m eans tha t ano ther set o f m odels is 
needed besides those used to interpret the functioning of human social systems, and 
that would be models ‘of the nature and function of language (linguistics)’ (M alina 
1982:232).
Another factor that has to be considered is the historical issue. The societies we 
wish to  study are ancient, historical societies. They are not present to be observed 
and compared with other societies. They are contained in texts (units of meaning) 
from the past (cf M alina 1982:233). Because o f the ‘distance’, in m ore than one 
sense, of those societies from our own, the meanings that prevailed in them would of 
necessity be alien to  us. History, as a model for the in terpre tation  of such alien 
m eaning, ‘seeks to explain events in term s of the distinctiveness of agents and 
agencies, in term s of particularities and differences. The o ther social sciences, 
rooted in the present, prescind from the past for the most part to seek out generali­
ties, commonalities, samenesses’ (M alina 1982:233). The problem  is that ‘in order 
to ferret out distinctiveness all the commonalities of the area under study have to be 
known and articulated’ (M alina 1982:233). Therefore, models of the social science 
sort need to be combined with models of the history sort and models of the linguistic 
sort to interpret (biblical) texts from the past (M alina 1982:233).
M alina (1982:233) distinguishes ‘three main types of social science models that 
one might use to understand social interaction’, namely the structural functionalist 
model, the conflict model, and the symbolic model. Elliott (1986:7; see also note 13 
on  the  sam e page) p refers to  designate these and o th e r styles of theorizing as 
‘theoretical perspectives’ rather than ‘models’.
The model (perspective) of structural functionalism  presupposes that society is 
in equilibrium , and ‘is a  relatively persistent, stable, w ell-integrated structure of 
e lem ents’ (M alina 1982:234; see also M alina 1986c:40,43-44). A ccording to  this 
view, all the elem ents in society function towards the maintenance of society as a 
whole, integral system (M alina 1982:234). Adaptive change may occur over time, 
but non-adaptive change is regarded as deviance (cf M alina 1982:234). This model 
is useful for determ ining typical structures and pa tte rn s  o f behaviour w ithin a 
society. M alina (1982:234 note 12) cites works by the following authors as examples 
o f structural functionalist approaches to  biblical texts: G ottw ald (1979); M alina 
(1981a); Wilson (1980).
Another, and different, type of model (perspective) is that of conflict theory, also 
known as the coercion, power or interest model (M alina 1982:234; 1986c:42-44). This 
type of model presupposes that society and the elem ents o f society are constantly
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changing, unless some force intervenes to prohibit the change. M alina (1982:235) 
states: ‘From  this perspective and in term s of this sort o f m odel, a  good way to 
understand biblical texts is to find out what elem ents or factors interfere with the 
norm al process of change....Social change, deviance, is norm al’. G ager’s Kingdom 
and community (1975) is cited as an example of the application of the conflict model 
(M alina 1982:235, note 13).
T he th ird  m ain type o f social science perspective focuses on the symbolic 
character of human interaction. O ther than the structural functionalist and conflict 
models, the symbolic model does not presuppose ‘that a social system is a group of 
interacting persons whose interactions are structured and oriented around common 
purposes’ (M alina 1982:235). According to this approach a social system is regarded 
as a ‘system of symbols, that is, meanings, values and feelings about the meanings 
and values th a t a re  a ttached  to  and em bodied  by persons, things, and even ts’ 
(M alina  1982:235). T he p resupposition  of th is m odel is th a t indiv idual and 
co llec tive  hum an  beh av io r is o rgan ized  a ro u n d  the  sym bolic m eanings and 
expectations attached to objects that are socially valued (M alina 1982:236). Biblical 
in te rp re te rs could use this m odel to  establish what roles, symbols, gestures, and 
definitions of situations are expressed or implied in the texts (cf M alina 1982:236). 
Some examples of the symbolic approach can be found in Feeley-H arnik (1981); 
M alina (1981b); Pilch (1981) (cf M alina 1982:236, note 14). (For examples of how 
these different perspectives have been applied to the same text, see Malina 1988b; 
Pilch 1988; Neyrey 1988).
M alina (1982:241; see also 1983:129-131) distinguishes five features that should 
characterize a  good social science model for biblical interpretation.
Minimally, the model should have the following features: (1) it should 
be a cross-cultural m odel, accounting for the in te rp re te r as well as 
those interpreted in some comparative perspective; (2) it should be of 
a  sufficient level o f abstraction  to  allow for the surfacing o f sim i­
larities that facilitates comparison; (3) the model should be able to fit 
a la rger sociolinguistic fram e for in te rp re ting  texts; (4) it should 
derive from experiences tha t m atch what we know of the tim e and 
p lace  co n d itio n ed  b ib lica l w orld  as closely as possib le ; (5) the 
meanings it generates should be irrelevant but understandable to us 
and our twentieth century United States society; (6) the application of
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the  m odel should be acceptab le  to  social scientists (even if they 
disagree with the validity of the enterprise).
(M alina 1982:241)
M alina h im self uses d iffe ren t in te rp re tive  m odels, a lthough  he is essentially  
com m itted to working from the perspective of cultural anthropology. C ultural 
anthropology, according to  Gottwald (1982:145), is ‘essentially structural-functional 
in character”. Gottwald (1982:155, note 14) cites Malina (1981b) as an example of a 
structural-functionalist approach. M alina (1982:236, note 14) himself, however, 
cites the sam e w ork as an exam ple o f the symbolic approach. In the words of 
Neyrey (1986:107) Malina, in his recent m ajor work (1986a), succeeded in deve­
loping ‘a  single macro-m odel for the investigation of the New Testam ent, viz., the 
cross-cultural model of British anthropologist Mary Douglas’ (Neyrey 1986:107; for 
a discussion on the definition and application of anthropology, see M alina 1986b: 
150-151). An im portant benefit of the use of cross-cultural models is that it requires 
the in te rp re te r to  constantly  take no te  of, and account for, h is /h e r own social 
location, and so the use of such models should act as a  de terren t for ethnocentric 
interpretation (M alina 1982:238-239; see M alina 1989 for a model of different time 
perceptions, and the importance of that for interpretation).
Ethnocentricity refers to the very common and universally found inclination of 
any individual or group to in terpre t the properties an d /o r  behavior o f any ‘alien’ 
individual an d /o r group in terms of the norms, values and characteristics of the own 
group. The concept ‘e thnocentrism ’ was introduced by W illiam G Sumner, and 
refers to a ‘view of things in which one’s own group is the center o f everything, and 
all others are scaled and rated with reference to  it’ (Sumner 1940:13). The values of 
the own group, as the in-group, ‘a re  equated with abstract, universal standards of 
morality and the practices of the in-group are exalted as be tter o r m ore "natural" 
than those o f any out-group’ (N oel 1971:33). C atton (1964:930) sum m arizes the 
essence of e thnocen trism  as follows: ‘E thnocen trism  m akes us see out-group 
behavior as deviation from in-group m ores ra ther than  as adherence to outgroup 
mores’.
D eserv ing  specia l m en tion  is M alin a’s c o n tr ib u tio n  in p o in tin g  ou t the 
distinction o f four basic social institutions or structures in any society - namely 
kinship, econom ics, politics, and relig ion  (M alina  1986b: 152-153). I found a 
correlate for this notion of Malina in a discussion by Gurvitch (1971:22-23) on types 
and forms of knowledge. Gurvitch made the following im portant observation:
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C ertain  types of knowledge, most particularly the perceptual know­
ledge of the external world, but also knowledge o f the O ther and the 
W e, groups, classes, etc., political knowledge, certain  branches of 
scientific knowledge arising from the natural sciences (astronom y, 
physics, biology, e tc .) o r hum an sciences (includ ing  histo ry  and 
sociology), involve the study of the specific space and time in which 
their objects move.
H e goes on to  say th a t the d ifferent types o f knowledge range them selves in an 
hierarchic system as soon as it comes to  social fram ew orks of m ajor im portance. 
And then, m ore im portantly, ‘ ...in this variable hierarchy the predom inant type or 
types penetrate all the others'. He gives the following example: ‘In Ancient Greece, 
philosophical knowledge and perceptual knowledge of the external world, which 
held first place, penetrated  all the other types of knowledge...’ (Gurvitch 1971:23). 
From  these references it is clear that M alina’s exposition on basic social institutions 
is not a  novel idea - it had its antecedents in sociology of knowledge’s reflections on 
different types o f  knowledge belonging to the different frameworks o f  knowledge within 
a specific time and place.
As a general rule, one of these institutions maintains primacy over the others in 
societal arrangements:
In Christendom  in the past, and in Islamic republics in the present, 
kinship, economics, and politics are em bedded in religion, i.e., the 
norms of kinship, economics, and politics are determ ined by the reli­
gious institution: representatives of the religious institution rule their 
societies in one way or another.
(M alina 1986b:153)
M alina (1986b: 153-154) goes on to cite examples where either kinship, economics or 
politics m aintained primacy and the other institutions were the em bedded ones (cf 
also Hollenbach 1985:153). The importance of this contribution lies in the fact that 
it sensitizes the interpreter to the fact that the society being studied was configured 
radically different from ours. The in terpre ter should therefore take extreme care 
not to be ethnocentrically anachronistic.
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3^ John H Elliott
Elliott, even at a  cursory reading, shows himself to have an excellent comm and of 
the theory and concepts of the social sciences, combining that with an informed way 
o f perceiving and handling the texts. H e is also the first o f the authors under 
consideration to  concentrate on the sociological interpretation of one single New 
T estam en t w riting (E llio tt 1981:7; see also Edwards 1983:442). (A ccording to 
E llio tt [1989], F ernando  Belo [1975] was th e  first scholar to  perform  a social- 
scientifíc analysis of a  single New Testam ent work, namely the Gospel of Mark.) In 
his m ajor work, Elliott (1981:1) states the intention of his ‘sociological exegesis’ as 
being to com plem ent and improve ‘the prevailing method of biblical interpretation 
through more rigorous attention to the social dimension of the biblical text and to 
the sociological dimension of the exegetical task’. H e defines ‘sociological exegesis’ 
as
th e  analysis, in terp re ta tion , and synthesis (correlation) o f (1) the 
literary, sociological and theological features and dimensions of the 
text (1 Peter) and (2) this text’s relation to  and im pact upon its nar­
rower and wider social contexts.
(Elliott 1981:8)
Wire (1984:209) underscores Elliott’s emphasis on the importance of the text: ‘...the 
text itself is the only witness to its specific situation....So it all comes back to literary 
analysis or what is more exactly called rhetorical analysis, searching the text for what 
E llio tt calls the "strategy" of the writer, and through tha t finding the situation...in 
which this particular strategy makes sense’.
The term  ‘strategy’ is o f interest and of im portance. E lliott (1981:10) defines 
the term  as referring to the deliberate design of a docum ent calculated to  have a 
specific social effect on its in tended  hearers o r readers. This has to  do with the 
pragm atic dim ension of the text, and includes aspects such as its goals, means, and 
intended function (Elliott 1987:2). Evidence of the strategy of a text can be found in 
its m anner of description, emphasis, and evaluation of certain selected features; the 
way in which it ‘proscribes or criticises and /or prescribes or praises’ certain actions, 
roles, institutions, attitudes, beliefs, et cetera, or ‘explains, justifies, and legitimates’ 
these (Elliott 1987:2). The ‘strategy’ has to be related  to  the ‘situation’ of the text. 
Situation, according to Elliott (1987:1; his emphasis).
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...involves various levels and phases. The macrosocial level o f a text 
concerns the macrosocial context of the text, the total social system in 
which the text is produced. The microsocial level o f  a text concerns the 
m ore specific social conditions and features of its specific sender(s) 
and receiver(s). The situation of a text can [be] viewed (a) syrwhroni- 
cally (w ith a tten tio n  to  social p a tte rn s  of behavior, in stitu tions, 
structures, processes and their relations at a given point or period in 
time, or (b) diachronically (with attention to how these social features 
and arrangements change over the course o f  time).
This correlation between the strategy and the situation of a text in fact constitutes the 
integration of a  literary and a social-scientific analysis of the text.
W hile a descrip tion  of the strategy of a text is pursued by mainly literary 
methods, a description of the situation of a text is sought by mainly social-scientific 
methods. In an article on methods and models Elliott (1986:1-33) sketches a model 
of the process of making sense of things. A tree structure of this model would use 
the term  ‘paradigm ’ to designate broad, inclusive ways of looking at realities (such 
as the historical-critical paradigm of biblical exegesis) and at a second level the term 
‘theoretical perspectives’ to  designate structural functionalism , conflict theory, 
symbolic interactionism, et cetera (cf Elliott 1986:7). According to these ‘theoretical 
perspectives’ specific m odels are employed to investigate, organize and explain 
social data (cf Elliott 1986:8).
3.6 Norman R Petersen
Petersen is the second author under consideration who undertook a social-scientific 
investigation of a single New Testam ent document, namely Paul’s L etter to Phile­
m on (P etersen  1985). P etersen’s approach in this w ork could be appropriately  
described as an integration of the salient elements of three key fields - two of them 
taken  from  the social sciences (sociology and anthropology) and the o ther from 
literary theory (narratology) - into ‘the traditional philological base of the historical 
critical method’ (Petersen 1985:bt; cf Hays 1987:173; Osiek 1987:39; D arr 1988:118, 
and W imbush 1988:121 for positive assessments o f Petersen’s accom plishment of 
this goal). Petersen (1985:ix) himself calls it a ‘literary sociological m ethod’. The 
term s used  to  describe  the th ree  fields o f in te re s t a re  a lready  suggestive of 
Petersen’s methodology: literary theory refers to the concepts point o f  view, narrative 
world (as opposed to contextual world), plot, and closure, which are all associated 
with narrative analysis; social anthropology refers inter alia to the concepts institution
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and social interaction, which are associated with social scientific analysis; sociology o f  
knowledge re fers to  the concept symbolic universe, which is associated  w ith an 
analysis of belief systems.
Petersen (1985:171, note 2) rem arks that the sociology of knowledge, as expli­
cated by B erger & Luckmann (1967), provides the theoretical fram ew ork within 
which he reads the work of both field and arm chair anthropologists. In an eva­
luation of the social-scientific side of Petersen’s work the rem ark referred to  should 
serve as a starting point, for it indicates that the sociology of knowledge provides the 
prim ary frame of reference according to  which he assays the im port o f any data of 
social interest.
3.6.1 Sociology of knowledge
E lsew here (V an S taden 1988:340-345) I have m ade a condensed survey of the 
sociology o f knowledge and its key concepts (as explicated by Berger & Luckmann 
1967) while attesting to its usefulness for the in terpre tation  of biblical texts (see 
Scroggs 1980:175; D e V illiers 1984:66; L ategan  1984:10 for sim ilarly positive 
evaluations). Petersen  utilizes several of these concepts in the construction and 
application of his model - concepts such as role, resocialization, legitimation, universe- 
maintenance, social institutions, and symbolic universe.
O ne of the major prem ises of the sociology of knowledge is that all thought is 
inextricably linked to  its delineation by the contem porary historical situation and 
locality (Klaus Berger 1977:240). Therefore Berger & Luckmann (1967:4) see the 
cen tra l p rob lem  of the sociology of know ledge as establish ing ‘the ex istential 
determ ination (Seinsgebundenheit) of thought as such’.
According to Berger & Luckmann (1967:5) this is a  general problem that arises 
when specific factors such as the historical, psychological, biological, economical or 
sociological, are seen as determinative of human thought. The postulate that social 
reality is created by man, and that man in turn is shaped by that reality, has led to 
the seemingly paradoxical statem ent of the sociology of knowledge that society is a 
product of man (Berger & Luckmann 1967:1,3,15), and man is a  product o f society 
(Berger 1973:13-14). This observation, that man and society reciprocally define one 
another, is o f fundam ental im portance for the exegesis o f New Testam ent texts - it 
red irec ts our a tten tio n  to  the fact th a t tim e is a capturing  device, both  for the 
historically ‘encapsulated’ society that we study through its literary products, and for 
the ‘encapsulated’ society into which we find ourselves absorbed. In essence this 
m eans th a t whilst the relationship  betw een m an and society has some universal 
traits, it also differs substantially betw een one tim e and place and others. M alina 
(1982:241) is no doubt correct when he states that the m eanings generated  by a
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social-scientific model for the ‘time and place’ conditioned biblical world should be 
irrelevant but understandable to us in twentieth-century society.
O ther definitions that describe the general significance of the sociology of 
knowledge are the following, taken from Gould & Kolb’s (\9(A:619), A  dictionary o f  
the social sciences:
■ ‘The proper them e of our study is to observe how and in what form intellectual 
life a t a given historical m om ent is related  to the existing social and political 
forces’ (M annheim 1952:237-260).
■ ‘Sociology of knowledge is the analysis of the functional interrelations o f social 
processes and structures on the one hand and the patterns of intellectual life, 
including the modes of knowing, on the other’ (Becker & Dahlke 1941:310).
■ ‘The sociology of knowledge...is concerned with the way in which systems of 
thought...are conditioned by other social facts (Sprott 1954:141).
It is clear from a reading of Petersen’s (1985) work that the social-scientific part of 
his interpretive model is based on his literary insight. In a discussion and evaluation 
o f the social-scientific elem ents of his approach the key literary elem ents would 
therefore have to be referred to again.
Probably the most im portant one of these literary elem ents for Petersen, is the 
concept o f the referential history, o r the narrative world of a narrative discourse. 
Petersen, following Eco (1979), understands the concept to refer to the world as it is 
rep re sen ted  in the text, and th a t w orld rep resen ts the re fe ren tia l function  of 
messages as explicated by Roman Jakobson (Petersen 1985:33, note 3; 1978:9-48). 
Defining the concept, Petersen (1985:33, note 3) states: ‘the world of a narrative is a 
literary construction, and the events which take place in that world have a narrative 
quality’. E lsew here he form ulates as follows: ‘The narrative world is tha t reality 
which a n a rra to r bestow s upon his actors and upon the ir actions....’ (P etersen  
1985:7). This literary-theoretical statem ent provides the link betw een the literary 
and social-scientific endeavours. A ccording to  P etersen  (1985:ix) ‘ "worlds” are 
human constructions, whether they are the constructions of societies or of narrators, 
and...narrative worlds are comprised o f the same kinds o f social facts - symbolic 
forms and social arrangem ents - as socalled real worlds’. In this way the literary 
concept of narrative worlds becomes accessible to social science analysis.
The link-up in Petersen’s approach, betw een the literary concept of the nar­
rative world as a constructed world, and the sociology of knowledge’s presentation of 
social reality as a constructed reality, seems almost inevitable. Petersen (1985:17-22, 
especially 20-21) argues consistently from the prem ise that narrative worlds and
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social reality are somehow akin in terms of construction and operation. Both these 
kinds of ‘worlds’ are analyzed in terms of two social-scientific categories, namely 
social arrangement and symbolic form , which constitute w hat are known as social 
facts (see Petersen 1985:38, note 49; 40, note 66 for a  brief discussion, and biblio­
graphical references, on the subject of social facts). Petersen (1985;x) gives the 
following definitions of these two categories (Petersen  1985:39, note 49 acknow­
ledges his indebtedness to the work of Berger & Luckmann 1967 for the use of these 
categories.):
‘Social arrangem ents’ have to do with the social structures underlying 
the social relations comprised by the actions of the actors....‘Symbolic 
forms’, on the other hand, have to do with the overarching cognitive 
systems, the systems of knowledge, belief, and value, that define these 
actors’ identities and motivate their actions.
Social a rran g em en ts , th e re fo re , have to  do w ith the social in s titu tio n s  one 
encounters in everyday life, institutions w ithin the fields o f econom ics, politics, 
religion and kinship. It has to do with the social relations enacted by the actors who 
represent these institutions. All these elements make up the fabric of what is known 
as the social universe (P etersen  1985:27-28) o r institutional order. This order, 
however, is a  segmented one, precisely by virtue of its institutionality. The discrete 
institu tional processes need to be in tegrated  into a com prehensive m eaningful 
system. This is done by the symbolic universe, which is an all-embracing frame of 
re fe ren ce  th a t prov ides an  in teg ra tive  m eaning fo r a society th a t consists of 
segm ented institutions and diverse subjective experiences (cf V an Staden 1988:349, 
summarizing Berger & Luckmann). Petersen (1985:57) defines a symbolic universe 
as a body of traditional knowledge known through language and symbol, a system of 
meanings that defines and thereby creates a  ‘world’. It shapes and legitimates social 
institutions (cf D arr 1988:120). The social universe, according to Petersen (1985:27- 
28), is inhabited  by both believers and non-believers, while G od and C hrist are 
absen t from  the social universe but p resent in the symbolic universe. They are 
presen t in the social universe only as objects of knowledge. T herefore Petersen 
m akes a distinction betw een theology and symbolic universe as represen ting  two 
different kinds of knowledge. He states:
Theology...is...a kind of knowledge that is the product o f systematic 
reflection  upon a  symbolic universe, and indeed of reflection  that 
serves to m aintain that universe when it is in some kind of jeopardy,
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as for example from the threats of doubt, of disagreement, or of com­
peting symbolic universes. Theology is...a kind of knowledge that is 
produced to defend and maintain the knowledge comprising a symbo­
lic universe, and for this reason we can speak of a symbolic universe 
as a prim ary (pre-reflective) form  of knowledge and theology as a 
secondary (reflective) form that is dependent on it.
(Petersen 1985:29-30)
According to  Hays (1987:173) the second chapter of Petersen’s Rediscovering Paul, 
which scrutinizes the social structures and arrangem ents depicted in the narrative 
world, is ‘the real heart of Petersen’s work’, offering the greatest advances in our 
understanding of Paul.
However, Hays (1987:174) is critical of Petersen’s distinction between ‘symbolic 
universe’ and ‘theology’. He describes Petersen’s survey of Paul’s symbolic universe 
as ‘looking very much like a summary of Pauline theology under the unifying themes 
of kinship and m aster-slave relations’. H e is also doubtful w hether the social- 
an th ropo log ica l categories allow  P e te rsen  to  adequately  display the  narrative 
structure of Paul’s ‘symbolic universe’.
3.62  Using social anthropology
To study these institutions and the social relations as presen ted  in the narrative, 
P e te rsen  em ploys the discipline o f social anthropology, a  subfield o f the social 
science ‘anthropology’. H e consciously chooses to use social anthropology, because 
it accom plishes w hat sociology cannot - nam ely it accounts for the category of 
symbolic forms and its relation to social arrangements (cf Petersen 1985:18).
The re la tionsh ip  betw een the w orlds explored by an th ropo log ists  and the 
narra tiv e  w orlds consists m ainly in  b o th  being ‘closed system s’ (see P etersen  
1985:40, note 61 and 63, for bibliographic references on this subject). This means 
that “when and as such worlds are experienced, they comprise an internally ordered 
w hole which is the ultim ate object o f interest, for it is the fram e of reference in 
which the parts make sense’ (Petersen 1985:20). The reader of a narrative and the 
anthropologist a re  also alike inasmuch as they are both ‘participant observers in 
other worlds’ (Petersen 1985:20).
A ccording to  the exposition by P e te rsen  the th ree  fields, nam ely narrative 
criticism, sociology of knowledge, and social anthropology, are com patible enough 
for them  to be incorporated into a  model with which to study the narrative world of 
a New T estam ent narrative discourse. The primary factor promoting compatibility
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is the fact tha t all th ree of these fields apply to the study of ‘worlds’ - narrative 
worlds, social worlds and symbolic universes. A nother link between the literary and 
social aspects of P etersen’s w ork was noted by D arr (1988:120): ‘Conspicuously 
absent from the field of view afforded by Petersen’s literary lens is the elem ent of 
characterization. This is hardly coincidental, for it is precisely at this point that the 
literary and the social are merged....That is, he treats the characters of Paul’s story 
solely in sociological terms’.
Finally, the sociology o f  knowledge has a relative independence w ithin the 
discipline o f sociology in the sense of form ulating its own epistem ology for the 
purpose of providing an explanation for the coming about and persistence of every­
day social reality. At the same time, the sociology of knowledge’s understanding of 
social reality, as advocated by Berger & Luckmann, to my mind bears a close resem­
blance to structural functionalism, one of the main perspectives on the functioning of 
society distinguished within the social sciences (cf Turner 1982:19-116).
4. CONCLUSION
T his survey of recen t scho larsh ip  was in tended  to  be m ore descrip tive than  
evaluative, although some evaluation is unavoidable and perhaps desirable. Broadly 
speaking, there are three major conclusions to be drawn from the survey:
■ A  definite distinction should be maintained between approaches concentrating 
on constructing a social history from and for the text, and approaches that wish 
to analyse the text by means of the methods and models developed in the social 
sciences.
m Both in the case of descriptive studies (or studies with the purpose of construc­
ting a social history o f early C hristianity) and in the case of explanatory or 
interpretive studies constituting a social-scientific analysis of the social forces 
and  in s titu tions of early  C hristian ity  (cf E llio tt 1981:6-7), one should be 
especially aware of the danger o f the fallacy o f  misplaced concreteness. This 
fallacy refers to the illegitimate application of the presumed meaning of a term 
or syntactical unit in antiquity to present-day problems. A case in point relating 
to a  descriptive study is Stegem ann’s explication of the m eaning of the term  
‘poo r’ in the New T estam ent and, based on tha t explication, his solution for 
treating the present-day poor (Stegemann 1984:54-64, 72-73 notes 68-77). It is 
also possible that even in terpretive social-scientific studies could reflect the 
same fallacy, inasmuch as they make no distinction between the narrative world 
and the contextual world of a text, or between the situation and the strategy of a
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text.
Finally, it has become clear that scholars in this field allocate differing levels of 
im portance to the composition of the narrative text. In the case of Theissen it 
seem s th a t m eanings conferred  on the m ateria l by a creative au th o r w ere 
completely ignored. Meeks and Malina made more of the text, but it was Elliott 
and Petersen who proposed that the text should be treated  in literary as well as 
in social-scientific terms. This is in agreem ent with my own assessm ent of the 
im port of both these directional approaches.
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